2004
Slip and Fall on Snow/Rock (Cooley)Washington, Mount Rainier, Liberty Ridge
Saturday, May 15th - Climber Scott Richards called Mount Rainier National Park on a cell phone requesting a rescue for his climbing partner Peter Cooley at 6:10 am, Saturday May 15th. The two-person team was ascending Liberty Ridge near 12,000 feet when Cooley’s crampon caught and he fell while leading. Richards was on the opposite side of the ridge crest when the accident occurred and was able to stop the fall using a hip belay. Cooley had fallen approximately 30 feet and hit his head, sustaining severe head trauma including a skull fracture as well as injuries to his left arm and leg. At roughly 6:30 am Ranger Mike Gauthier advised Richards via cell phone to chop out a platform, secure their tent, and stabilize and prepare Cooley for a lengthy evacuation. Scheduled cell phone calls were arranged to conserve the team’s cell phone batteries.
An Oregon Army National Guard Chinook and contract helicopter and climbing field teams were assembled for the rescue. At that time the weather was deteriorating rapidly, and forecasts predicted large amounts of precipitation. On its initial reconnaissance, the contract helicopter approached Liberty Ridge but due to whiteout conditions was forced to land on the Carbon Glacier at 8,000 feet and wait for a clearing. Because of the increasing clouds near the mountain, the Oregon National Guard Chinook helicopter was sent to Rimrock, WA instead of Kautz Helibase inside the park to connect with an aviation rescue team of NPS rangers and Rainier Mountaineering guides (RMI.)
An air-assisted rescue seemed uncertain because of weather conditions so a field team of two climbing rangers was hastily assembled and dispatched to make a quick ascent of Liberty Ridge. The advanced climbing rescue team of David Gottlieb and Chris Olson departed Ipsut Creek Campground Saturday at 4:00 pm. Heavy rain and snowfall slowed Gottlieb and Olson, forcing them to bivouac on lower Curtis Ridge that evening. A second team consisting of five climbing rangers also assembled at Ipsut Creek Campground. They carried extra supplies and prepared to support the advance team for a lengthy ground evacuation.
Late afternoon clearing around the mountain allowed the contract helicopter to depart the Carbon Glacier and return to Kautz Helibase. Richards was apprised of the rescue efforts and difficulties. He prepared for a night on the mountain at the accident site with Cooley.
Sunday, May 16th - Via cell phone, Richards reported that Cooley was in and out of consciousness all night and was unable to eat or drink. The weather remained inclement for much of the day.
A team of five climbers from Tacoma Mountain Rescue (TMR) departed Ipsut Creek Campground at 11:00 am after a briefing at Longmire. Another TMR team of two staffed the Camp Muir hut. The Chinook Helicopter with a NPS/RMI rescue team was held on standby in Yakima awaiting a break in the weather. The Chinook team prepared for a hoist insertion and evacuation of Cooley. The contract helicopter was also placed on standby at Kautz Helibase. Equipment and food caches to support field teams and rescue operations were prepared. Food, fuel, communication and rescue equipment were ferried via ground teams to lower Curtis Ridge (7,200 feet). Another cache for a yet-to-be-established field operations base camp was prepared at Kautz Helibase for a helicopter drop. A third sling load of supplies including a rescue litter was prepared for Richards at the accident site. In all, over 60 people joined in the rescue effort; the event generated international media attention.
At noon, the Chinook team attempted a flight with rescue personnel but heavy cloud cover and foul weather caused the mission to be aborted. Difficult climbing conditions and harsh weather made progress for the ground/climbing teams very arduous. Rangers Gottlieb and Olson worked through whiteout conditions and deep snow on the Carbon Glacier to prepare a field operations base camp at 8,800 feet in the Carbon Glacier basin below Willis Wall. A six-person climbing ranger team later joined them while the TMR team prepared a camp at 7,200 feet on lower Curtis Ridge. At 6:35 pm the weather briefly cleared above the Carbon Glacier, allowing the contract helicopter to conduct reconnaissance at the accident site and deliver a sling load of supplies, including a radio to replace Richard’s dead cell phone.
On the evening of May 16th, climbing rangers Gottlieb and Charlie Borgh prepared for an ascent of Liberty Ridge on the morning of the 17th. They planned to access the accident site, a 50-55 degree ice slope at roughly 12,000 feet, evaluate the scene and determine the feasibility for a helicopter evacuation or, if impossible, a technical rope rescue. Behind them climbing rangers Greg Johnson, Olson, Andy Anderson, Adrienne Sherred and Bree Loewen, laden with camping and rigging equipment, climbed to Thumb Rock and established an advanced camp. Ranger Glenn Kessler remained at base camp to manage field operations.
The Oregon Guard Chinook helicopter and crew remained on alert in Yakima and a contract helicopter remained on station at Kautz helibase. Richards, still at the accident site with Cooley was alerted of the plan.
Monday, May 17th - The contract helicopter attempted to sling load additional supplies to the climbing teams however the weather again thwarted the aviation operation. The Chinook insertion team also attempted a mountain flight but was unable due to weather and was forced to return to Yakima. Additional supplies and equipment were ferried via ground teams from Ipsut Creek campground to 7,200 feet on Lower Curtis Ridge.
Around noon, Gottlieb and Borgh arrived at the 11,800 foot accident site. Gottlieb attempted a medical assessment and relayed information to medical control via cell phone. Only limited care could be provided due to the conditions, patient and rescuer safety concerns. The team also prepared the area and set ice anchors preparing for a technical rescue. The weather improved throughout the afternoon and at 2:30 pm, the contract helicopter delivered a sling load to the 8,800 foot camp, while a supply cache was transported to Thumb Rock. The stabilizing weather also allowed the Chinook insertion team to head for the mountain at 4:30 pm.
As the Chinook lumbered over the mountain at 5:03 pm, Cooley was extracted via vertical litter hoist. He was immediately flown to Madigan Hospital and, very sadly, pronounced dead. Gottlieb and Borgh descended Liberty Ridge with Richards to spend the night at Thumb Rock.
Tuesday, May 18th - Gottlieb, Borgh and Richards descended the remainder of Liberty Ridge and were flown off the mountain from 8,800 feet along with the two other climbing rangers overseeing field aviation operations. All other field personnel descended to Ipsut Creek Campground, picking up the caches on their way.
Analysis:
Cooley and Richards were accomplished climbers, and this accident was not a result of any lapse in judgment or lack of skill. Cooley’s short, but ultimately fatal fall seems to be the result of an unfortunate misstep. Cooley was wearing a climbing helmet, but sometime during the fall he hit his head on a rock that contacted his temple just under the helmet brim. That impact eventually caused his death.
Any serious injury on a remote route at high elevation can be life-threatening due to the difficulty of access and evacuation. This accident highlights the difficulties of high altitude rescue on technical terrain, particularly when exacerbated by poor weather. Aviation is a key element of many successful upper-mountain rescues of climbers with serious injuries. When weather precludes flying, the survival of a critically injured climber is often compromised.
The fact that Richards was able to care for his climbing partner for almost 60 hours on a small exposed platform that he chopped in ice during poor weather speaks highly of him as an alpinist, rescuer and friend. The NPS strongly recommends choosing climbing partners carefully, considering not only the ability to reach the summit, but how a partner will perform in the event of an emergency or stressful situation.
While many were saddened by the outcome of this extended event after so much effort by so many people, it should be noted that the rescue was also a great success in that Richards returned safely and no rescuers were hurt. Without his climbing partner Richards would have been placed in the difficult position of soloing the route in order to reach safety.
Slip and Fall on Snow/Rock (Cahill)Washington, Mount Rainier, Liberty Ridge
On June 3rd at 7:15 am, Ranger Mike Gauthier was informed by dispatch of a climbing accident on Liberty Ridge below the Black Pyramid. Alan Hartman, the reporting party, stated that he witnessed two climbers fall several hundred feet, both sustaining serious injuries. He reported that a climber, later identified as John Cahill, possibly suffered a broken back and arm, and that his partner, later identified as Mark Anderson, had a hand injury and knee injuries as well as numerous contusions and abrasions.
The park requested assistance from both military and civilian helicopters. The Oregon National Guard offered a Blackhawk SAR helicopter with capability to perform the mission at 13,000 feet, however it was not immediately available. A civilian contractor, Whirlwind, had a bell-Jet Ranger in the area that was immediately available. At approximately 8:00 am, the helicopter began a reconnaissance flight with Ranger Gauthier. Shortly thereafter, the recon flight located an injured party at 11,800 feet on Liberty Ridge, near a “power-on” (hover) landing site. A plan was formulated to insert five climbing rangers close to the scene by “power-on” landings with another, more powerful A-Star helicopter. The Rangers were to access the scene, assess the patients, and prepare for an evacuation. The Blackhawk helicopter would later hoist the patients and transport them directly to a hospital.
At approximately 8:45 am, Hartman stated that a Danish climber was now on scene with Cahill, the most critically injured of the two patients. Hartman reported that Cahill was conscious but shocky and in extreme pain with breathing difficulties. During the fall, he had sustained serious injuries including head trauma, a broken leg, a broken arm, and broken ribs. Hartman also reported that Anderson was alert and straddled a rock 50 feet above Cahill with a severely injured hand and knee.
The park maintained scheduled contact with Hartman for the remainder of the incident. At 9:33 am, Hartman requested a bag-valve mask because Cahill needed rescue breathing. Soon thereafter, Hartman reported that Cahill no longer had a pulse and that CPR had been initiated. Hartman called back at 10:05 am to report that CPR had been stopped after approximately 30 minutes.
Hartman informed the NPS that there were five other climbers on scene who had postponed their summit climb to assist with the rescue. There was concern about the time needed to safely summit, as it was getting late and the climbers didn’t have enough equipment to safely down climb or assist with a technical lowering. Hartman was advised that climbing rangers would assist once on scene and that a sling load of equipment and supplies would be inserted at Thumb Rock. Moreover he was informed that the climbing rangers would probably conduct the rescue without further assistance.
The A-Star helicopter inserted rangers Gauthier, Gottlieb, Hendrickson and Olson over the course of two flights on a spiny rock outcropping near 11,000 feet on Liberty Ridge. The rangers ascended the ridge, reaching the accident site and Anderson at 1:27 pm. Once on scene, the NPS thanked the five independent climbers for their tremendous efforts and released them to finish their ascent of Liberty Ridge before nightfall.
The accident scene was steep, icy and exposed. Anderson was anchored to a rock outcropping directly below the Black Pyramid; Cahill was below him, tied off to a badly shredded climbing rope. Gauthier and Olson assessed Anderson and determined that it would be too hazardous to lower him off the route. It was evident that his leg and arm injuries would prevent him from assisting in the effort. Anderson was prepped for the helicopter hoist while rangers Gottlieb and Hendrickson rappelled a steeper pitch to assess Cahill. Once on scene, Cahill’s condition was confirmed and he was also prepared for hoist.
While the rangers prepared Anderson and investigated the site, the A-Star helicopter sling-loaded a supply cache at Thumb Rock. In doing so, they led the Oregon Guard Blackhawk helicopter to the accident scene. At 2:30 pm, Anderson was hoisted from the ridge and flown to Harborview Medical Center. Cahill’s body was retrieved on a subsequent flight at 3:39 pm. After which, the climbing rangers down climbed to Thumb Rock where they spent the night. The following day, the rangers descended the ridge to a landing zone on the Carbon Glacier and were shuttled off the mountain.
During this incident, a second climbing accident was reported on the Emmons Glacier at approximately 3:30 pm. The same incident management team handled both operations.
Loss of Control While Glissading (Thiel)Washington, Mount Rainier, Emmons/Winthrop Glacier Route
On June 3rd, Doug Thiel, 40, and his two climbing partners summited Mount Rainier via the Emmons Glacier Route. On their descent, Thiel started to experience a great deal of knee pain. The pain became so intense that he preferred to glissade instead of walking down. Thiel decided to glissade while roped and wearing crampons; it was the team’s intent to descend in this fashion back to Camp Schurman.
At 11,600 feet Thiel hit an icy section and was unable to stop his slide. He slid uncontrollably past his partners and pulled them off their feet, all three fell 75-100 feet before Thiel’s two partners arrested. Thiel sustained a lower left leg injury in the process and recalled the rope wrapping around his leg, which he feels contributed to the injury.
At 3:30 pm, the Park received a cell phone call from Thiel’s team detailing the accident and requesting assistance. With a large rescue and body recovery already in progress on Liberty Ridge, the I.C. dispatched a reserve climbing ranger team to the site of the new accident. Climbing rangers Stefan Lofgren and Stoney Richards were inserted on the Emmons Glacier via light helicopter near 11,300 feet. They ascended to the accident site, assessed Thiel and then carried him to a Landing Zone (LZ.) From that LZ Thiel was flown to the Kautz Helibase where he was transferred to an ambulance.
Analysis:
Thiel wanted to avoid requesting outside help while descending. Unfortunately, glissading, particularly on the upper mountain glaciers while wearing crampons, is dangerous. It would have been safer and more efficient for Thiel’s partners to have steadily lowered him in a sitting position, one rope-length at a time. On most sections they could have simply lowered him hand over hand. On steeper sections, they could have lowered him off set protection (pickets, ice axes, etc). In the end, it is always best to avoid glissading.
A reserve climbing rescue team established during the initial Liberty Ridge incident provided the opportunity to seamlessly complete this second mission. The mission difficulties were amplified, however, by a Park-wide power outage that cut base radio and phone line communications.
Avalanche (Casady/Vizcaya)Washington, Mount Rainier, Liberty Ridge
Luke Casady and Ansel Vizcaya departed White River Campground on Friday June 11th for a planned ascent of Liberty Ridge. The exact details of the subsequent 48 hours may never be known, but the facts uncovered during the subsequent search, body recoveries, and ensuing investigation suggest the following:
Casady and Vizcaya, experienced climbers, camped along Curtis Ridge on Friday and began the ascent up Liberty Ridge early Saturday morning. It is likely the pair climbed past Thumb Rock, around and continued up the ridge as the first signs of incoming weather appeared. With the winds building and the visibility decreasing the climbers continued pushing forward. By early evening, the reports at Camp Muir included significantly higher winds and heavy snowfall. Casady and Vizcaya were somewhere high on Liberty Ridge, and probably realized that they would have to hunker down and wait out the storm.
Through the night, winds hammered the mountain, blowing snow from some areas while building large slabs in others. This was an uncomfortable night for climbers everywhere on Mount Rainier; heavy snowfall and high winds destroyed several tents at Camp Muir.
By Sunday morning several inches of snow had fallen, but more importantly, the high winds had deposited large amounts of snow on leeward slopes. Casady and Vizcaya were probably camped between 12,900 feet and 13,500 feet above the Black Pyramid. Sometime during that night or the next day, Casady and Vizcaya were caught in a large avalanche. The avalanche probably released several hundred feet above them but below Liberty Cap. The avalanche most likely encompassed them and the entire upper route; everything was pushed down the 4,000 foot Liberty Wall to the Carbon Glacier. Neither climber could have survived the fall.
The storm turned back many teams back and significantly slowed the progress of others. Several teams were reported overdue, but this is expected following harsh weather. On June 16th at approximately 1:00 pm, rangers reported ten additional climbers descending the Emmons Glacier route (1); all were moving slowly. Progress for the climbers to the trailhead was so slow that rangers were unable to interview them until the morning of June 17th. All had climbed Liberty Ridge, some beginning their trips before, and some after, the Casady/Vizcaya team. None of the climbers reported seeing Luke and Ansel. A large-scale search was then initiated.
Rangers were dispatched to Camp Schurman to interview any remaining Liberty Ridge climbers descending the Emmons Glacier route, while aerial reconnaissance commenced near Liberty Ridge and the Carbon Glacier. Nearly an hour into the aerial search, a backpack and body were spotted on the Carbon Glacier below Liberty Wall at roughly 9,200 feet. Winds prevented the helicopter from landing near to the body, which rested near a large avalanche debris cone. The weather was very warm and many avalanches of significant size were noted from Liberty Wall. The location where the body was discovered is known particularly for its rock and ice fall hazards. For this reason ground recovery operations were planned at first light the next morning (during the coolest temperatures). Aerial search continued for the second climber that afternoon.
Further aerial reconnaissance on June 17th revealed a second backpack and climbing rope near the avalanche debris. An avalanche fracture line was also observed at approximately 13,600 feet on Liberty Ridge. After the recon flight, rangers Stoney Richards and Glenn Kessler were inserted on Curtis Ridge at 7,400 feet to continue observations with a telescope and support recovery operations the following day.
On the morning of June 18th a helicopter inserted rangers Chris Olson and Matt Hendrickson near the 9,000 feet on the Carbon Glacier. They quickly accessed the body and backpacks and had them flown out. After which, the rangers continued ground searching using avalanche transceivers. Their efforts were focused on the area near the recovered body and gear but no further clues were discovered. Due to further avalanche possibility and other safety issues, the ground team searched for one hour until the day got warmer.
A subsequent aerial search on June 18th revealed additional clues approximately 50 yards west of the recovered climber. Kessler and Richards were inserted on the glacier to investigate and dig through the snow debris. Nothing more was found and aerial searching resumed. The primary aerial search area consisted of Liberty Ridge, Liberty Wall, Willis Wall and the likely “fall lines” off of the Liberty Ridge. These were strongly considered to be the most likely areas in which to find clues.
On June 19th an Oregon Army National Guard Chinook helicopter with NPS Rangers conducted another aerial search while rescuing two other climbers at Thumb Rock. No new clues were detected.
On June 22nd a private contract ship provided additional aerial assistance. During that flight a climbing harness, carabiners, pulley and ice axe were spotted near 9,400 feet on the Carbon Glacier. Those clues were located near the avalanche debris cone below Liberty Wall; they were not retrieved.
On July 13th a climber reported seeing a large blue object on the Carbon Glacier near 9,300 feet while solo climbing Liberty Ridge. On July 14th and 15th climbing rangers Greg Johnson, Brent Rosato and Charlie Borgh climbed to the site and confirmed a body. Rangers Gauthier and Steve Klump were inserted via contract helicopter on July 15th to retrieve the remains. The body was successfully recovered via long line at 7:00 pm.
Analysis:
Casady and Vizcaya were found in their climbing harnesses but unroped (the rope found had no knots in it.) Their packs were largely packed, yet the pair had their parkas on. It appeared as though they were either still in camp, in the process of setting up or in the process of breaking camp when the avalanche occurred.
The fracture line noted on Liberty Wall was direct evidence of a large slab avalanche whose crown extended halfway to Ptarmigan Ridge, some 250 meters. The crown was only observed from the air, but appeared to vary in thickness from about 25-100cm. Whether or not this crown belonged to the avalanche that swept the climbers to their deaths is uncertain, as a smaller slide could have caught them. Large avalanches were occurring on the mountain following the Saturday night storm.
Other observations during the search indicated that large avalanches had run on other slopes in the general vicinity of Liberty and Ptarmigan Ridges. There had been no climbers on these slopes so it was concluded that most slides were naturally triggered events. It seems unlikely, that there were any climbers above Casady and Vizcaya, yet this remains unknown. The climbers had indicated when they registered that they had avalanche transceivers with them though neither was wearing one. A transceiver, however, would have provided no protection from such an avalanche.
It is important to note that snowstorms and avalanches do occur on Mount Rainier in the summer. Climbers during all seasons should be prepared to assess and mitigate avalanche issues.
(1) Additional climbers mean those in excess of the climbers that started out from Camp Schurman.
Stranded, Exceeding Abilities, Incompatible Partners, Poor Communication (Penn/Hancock)Washington, Mount Rainier, Liberty Ridge
Bruce Penn and Al Hancock departed White River to climb Liberty Ridge on June 13, 2004. It took them three days to reach the base of Liberty Ridge. On the third day, while looking at Liberty Ridge, Penn voiced concern to Hancock about the steepness of the route and his ability to climb it.
They spent the day talking about descent, but decided to re-evaluate their plan at the base of Liberty Ridge. On the fourth day, June 16th, an apprehensive Penn decided to start up the ridge with Hancock setting anchors and belaying every pitch. It took 14 hours for the pair to reach Thumb Rock; both individuals were exhausted and dehydrated when they finally arrived.
Penn knew that it should only take 4 to 6 hours to reach Thumb Rock from lower Curtis Ridge. He was surprised that other climbing parties were not placing protection and climbing the lower ridge without belay. He then realized that their climbing method was not practical for the route.
On the fifth morning, June 17th, Penn knew that he could not complete the climb and called 911 on his cell phone to ask for assistance. He did not discuss this with Hancock, and only informed him after the call had already occurred. That call reached Supervisory Climbing Ranger Mike Gauthier; during the conversation, Penn stated that his team could not go up or down but added that there were no injuries and they had enough food and fuel for a few days. Since there was no obvious urgency, and because an active SAR was already in progress on Liberty Ridge, Gauthier informed Penn that they would have to wait for a rescue or assistance.
At 12:44 pm, Penn called again stating that he “could not climb up or down from Thumb Rock.” Penn again acknowledged that he and his partner were okay, but that their arms were quite sore, they were dehydrated and that they had “bad vibes” about the route. Hancock felt that their best option was to continue the climb up and over, but refused to go back down. Penn was unwilling to continue up or down even with additional supplies and gear the NPS offered to drop at their location. It was explained to Penn that another more urgent SAR was in progress and that they would need to remain where they were until more personnel and resources were available.
At 7:30 Penn again called the Park requesting a helicopter rescue. When told that their rescue would still require a belayed down-climb, Penn seemed unwilling to cooperate. He said, “I just want to be off the mountain.”
On the sixth day, June 18th, arrangements were made with the Oregon National Guard for a helicopter hoist of the pair as rescue and recovery efforts remained ongoing for Casady and Vizcaya. Rangers made two airdrops for Penn and Hancock at Thumb Rock; those drops contained food, fuel and a cell phone.
On the seventh day, June 19th, an Oregon National Guard Chinook helicopter flew to the scene with three climbing rangers aboard. Ranger David Gottlieb was lowered to Thumb Rock via hoist and assisted both climbers back into the helicopter. The climbers were successfully removed from the mountain that day.
Analysis:
Penn and Hancock met on a guided climb of Mount McKinley the previous year. They had not climbed together before, but did discuss and research Mount Rainier and Liberty Ridge extensively. Some climbers often overlook the important aspect of climbing relationships and partner compatibility. The importance of a skills assessment, common goals and similar abilities are sometimes overshadowed by the excitement of summiting the mountain or “doing a route.”
A commendable aspect of this incident was that the team realized things were not going well and pulled back before getting injured. The NPS recognizes that people commit errors in judgment and make mistakes, but suggests that climbers not proceed when originally presented with questionable situations.
As a reminder, Liberty Ridge requires a substantial amount of physical strength, technical skill, effective communication and comfort with a heavy pack on steep ice for 6,000 feet of climbing.
Potential Fall on Ice (Baker)Washington, Mount Rainier, Kautz Glacier
On June 30th, Dallas Baker, 27, sustained a dislocated shoulder while descending the upper ice pitch of the Kautz Glacier near 11,800 feet. He was facing the glacier slope with his axes in the ice when his footing gave way. He was able to use his ax and catch the fall, but strained and dislocated his shoulder during the slip. Unable to reset the shoulder, his partner Alex Carroll called 911 seeking help from the NPS. The two slowly continued their descent to Camp Hazard.
A Hughes 500D helicopter was diverted from ongoing aviation operation to assist with the incident. Climbing ranger Stoney Richards was inserted at a small LZ on the cleaver separating the Turtle Snowfield from the Kautz Glacier around 11,000 feet. Richards climbed to the team and assessed Baker. By this time Baker’s shoulder had reduced on its own. Despite Baker’s improved condition, he was assisted back to the LZ and extracted with Richards to Kautz Helibase.
Analysis:
Baker was able to prevent a substantial fall by holding onto his planted ice tool. His dislocated shoulder seems to have been a much better option than falling down the 45 degree ice slope. The team was using a running belay as they downclimbed the route, so hopefully if he had fallen he would have been caught as soon as the rope between the climbers came under tension.
The result of a fall of this type, even if the running belay protection held, would probably have caused more serious injuries than a dislocated shoulder. A very similar accident at approximately the same location occurred six weeks later. In the second accident, however, a longer fall resulted and the running protection (two ice screws) ripped out.
Loss of Control While Glissading (Rettig)Washington, Mount Rainier, Unicorn Peak
On the morning of July 24th, a four-person team from the Mazamas Climbing Club set out to climb Unicorn Peak in the Tatoosh Range. On the descent from the summit at roughly 2:30 pm, Joska Rettig, 50, lost control while glissading a steep snowfield. She sustained a serious injury to her left knee and leg when she impacted the rocks at the base of the snowfield. One member of the team was sent to seek assistance from the NPS while climb leader Jae Ellers splinted Rettig’s leg with an ice axe and started her crawling back towards the road. Her progress was exceedingly slow, but very admirable.
Ellers was beginning a belay of Rettig down the steep loose rock gully feeding Snow Lake when climbing rangers Glenn Kessler and Thomas Payne arrived. The rangers assisted in Rettig’s descent until they met another NPS team of rescuers. That team placed Rettig on a backboard and then into a litter for what became a night carryout to the trailhead. Upon reaching the Snow Lake trailhead, Rettig was transferred to an awaiting ambulance.
Analysis:
Don’t glissade. It is safer to walk than to glissade; glissading is a tempting option that often results in lost equipment and injuries. The slope on which Rettig lost control was a combination of hard and soft snow. It is very likely that Rettig was able to control her speed on the upper sections of the slope where the sun had been shining for hours, but was unable to slow herself on the lower, mostly shaded section.
Fall on Glacier, Failure to Adequately Protect, Protection Pulled (Fry/Dufay)Washington, Mount Rainier, Kautz Glacier Route
On August 8th, at about 9:15 am while leading the second icy pitch of the Kautz Glacier Route, Bryan Fry, 28, fell on the 45-degree icy pitch. What protection had been placed between him and his partner, John Dufay, 25, pulled out as Fry fell. Fry’s fall jerked Dufay off the slope and the pair tumbled an estimated 400 to 600 feet before coming to a complete rest in a shallow crevasse.
Dufay suffered multiple lacerations and contusions during the fall; Fry sustained several minor injuries and a badly broken ankle. Dufay assisted Fry onto a narrow shelf in the crevasse and made him as comfortable as possible before seeking help. Dufay unroped and descended the route and through the ice chute back towards Camp Hazard. In the ice chute above Camp Hazard, Dufay met an RMI guide, Lyndon Mallory, who radioed the NPS for help.
Due to the terrain at the accident site, and the anticipated hazards involved in a carryout, an air evacuation was the fastest and safest option available. At 11:20 am, ranger Glenn Kessler spoke directly with Dufay via radio and received a first-hand account of the situation. Mallory then ascend with Dufay back to the accident site and helped care for Fry. A helicopter hoist operation was arranged to evacuate Fry from the location.
At 4:52 pm, an Oregon Army National Guard Blackhawk lifted off from Kautz Helibase and flew to the accident site with ranger Kessler. Kessler was hoisted onto the glacier where Fry and Mallory were waiting. Fry was assessed, prepared for evacuation and hoisted back into the Blackhawk with Kessler. Mallory and Dufay descended on foot but were slowed by Dufay’s injuries and exhaustion. The two bivied around 9,000 ft. and arrived at the Comet Falls Trailhead at noon the next day.
Analysis:
Fry and Dufay were lucky not of have fallen farther; the Kautz Glacier becomes an icecliff only a few hundred feet below where they came to rest. Fry reported that he had only one or two 9cm ice screws placed when he fell.
Dufay recalls getting in position to arrest Fry’s fall, but was unsuccessful stopping the fall due to the steep angle and icy conditions. He recalls slowing several times thinking the fall was over, only to be yanked downhill again. When he came to rest, he was “balled up” in the rope. Given the distance of their fall, it is impressive that both did not suffer more severe injuries.
While the Kautz Glacier route can be an ice-free snow climb until midseason, several parties have underestimated the difficulty of late season conditions. As the winter snow cover disappears and more ice presents itself, there is a need for more ice climbing equipment. It is difficult to predict how much ice climbing gear may be needed given variety of conditions possible. It is best to prepare for the worst and bring a few extra screws.
Fall on Rock, Climbing Unroped, Uprepared for Conditions, Lack of Experience, Stranded on Route (Duncan)Washington, Mount Rainier, Knapsack Pass
On October 2nd at 6:00 pm, a group of seven service members on leave from Fort Lewis Army Base began a hike to Knapsack Pass in the Mowich Lake area. Forty-five minutes into the hike, two members of the party observed a rock face south of Knapsack Pass and decided to try and climb it to summit the ridge.
As the two started up the face, one fell about 60 vertical feet onto a talus slope and rolled another 100 feet before stopping. Michael Duncan, 19, sustained serious head, neck and back injuries including 4 broken vertebrae and numerous lacerations, contusions and abrasions. His party members rushed to his aid and provided basic care. Meanwhile, the second climber became stranded on the face and needed help to descending. With sunset approaching, one of the party members hiked back to Mowich Lake to summon help.
Upon receiving a 911 call at about 10:00 pm, NPS rangers responded to the scene while a military helicopter was launched from Fort Lewis. Rangers stabilized Duncan until the military medic was inserted via hoist to the accident site. Duncan was then placed in a litter and hoisted into the hovering helicopter and taken to a hospital.
Rangers Uwe Nehring, Ritterbusch, Walker, Hull, Burns and Bagocius then turned their attention to the cold, stranded climber who was perched on a small overhanging ledge, wearing only a t-shirt, shorts and sneakers. The temperature, now in the lower 40’s, was dropping as ranger Nehring climbed to the ledge and set up an anchor station that allowed the other rangers to lower the stranded man to safety.
Analysis:
Climbing without experience or protection could have cost both young men their lives. The fifth class face they chose to climb warranted a rope, rock protection, harnesses and some climbing skill and experience. The pair admitted that they had none of these.
Poor planning and decision-making led to additional suffering on the part of all the men. None were prepared for unexpected delays and nighttime operations. Wearing only shorts, t-shirts and sneakers, the team had left the trailhead near dusk on an autumn day enroute to an elevation of 6,300 ft without warm clothing, lights or any kind of emergency overnight gear. Every member of the party was an EMT, which significantly contributed to saving Duncan’s life.
Glissading With Crampons (Beoffoli)Washington, Mount Rainier, Muir Snowfield
On October 3rd shortly after 4:30 pm, Chris Beoffoli, 34, began his descent from Camp Muir. While glissading near 7,800 feet on the Muir Snowfield, Beoffoli caught his left crampon on the snow and fractured his ankle.
At 5:15 pm Mt. Rainier National Park received the 911 cell phone call requesting a rescue. Shortly after sunset, an eight person NPS ground evacuation team began their ascent to the accident site. They arrived on scene two hours later and assessed Beoffoli’s condition, packaged and lowered him back to Paradise in a litter. They arrived at the trailhead at 1:00 am. Beoffoli was released into the care of his partner who drove him a hospital for treatment.
Analysis:
If you must glissade, remove your crampons, know your descent line and watch for changing snow/ice conditions. Every year numerous climbers and hikers must be rescued because they choose to glissade.
Avalanche (Koester/Little)Washington, Mount Rainier, Ingraham Glacier
On Sunday October 24th, climbers Aaron Koester and Matt Little contemplated a summit ascent from their high camp at Cadaver Gap, but due to a late start the pair instead decided to train and explore and the crevasses on the Ingraham Glacier. Near 11,700 feet, the team entered a large cavernous crevasse close to the Disappointment Cleaver. They traversed some 75 yards into the crevasse and found an exit ramp out the other side. While ascending the 35-40 degree exit ramp, the snow slope fractured and slid.
The slab was estimated to be about 8-14” thick and ran roughly 150 feet. The avalanche swept both climbers back into the crevasse. Koester was pinned against the ice wall of the crevasse and was completely buried by the debris. Little was partially buried; only his arm and head were exposed. Little spent about 30 minutes extricating himself from the entrapment before beginning the search for his partner. By the time he located and freed Koester’s head, Koester had no pulse and was “very blue.”
Little left the accident site and descended the Ingraham Glacier back to high camp, packed up the team’s equipment and continued down to Camp Muir. Along the descent, Little attempted to contact the authorities using a family service radio. A hunter picked up the transmission and notified the NPS of the accident at 4:58 pm. Twenty minutes later, Little arrived at Camp Muir and called the Park on the Camp Muir emergency radio. After providing more specific information about the accident, Little descended to Paradise and met with park rangers.
The following day, climbing rangers Mike Gauthier, Bree Loewen, and Adrienne Sherred with the assistance of an MD 500 contract helicopter were inserted at Ingraham Flats, 11,000 feet. They climbed to the cavernous crevasse and performed the body recovery. An analysis of the fracture, slide, and ramp area was not possible however, due to lingering instability in the snowpack, time limitations and deteriorating weather. Koester’s body was successfully recovered that day.
Analysis:
A recent storm had deposited only a few inches of snow, but high winds preceding the climb had transported this snow significantly. Many areas were scoured; others had deep pockets of snow. Autumn is an atypical time for avalanche accidents, at that time of year the dangers of falling on hard ice, snow bridges collapsing, rockfall and icefall are generally more pressing. As this accident illustrates, climbers must evaluate the avalanche risks at any time of year.
The fact that these climbers chose to wear avalanche beacons on the day of the incident indicates and increased level avalanche awareness. They knew that they were in avalanche terrain and that there was a possibility of a slide occurring. However, no assessments of the snow stability took place. It is possible that if the climbers had done an assessment, they may have recognized the snow instability and avoided the terrain trap.
As the use of avalanche transceivers has become more standard in alpine climbing, it’s important for climbers to connect the reasoning of wearing such a device with the conditions. Donning a transceiver does not prevent the consequences of an avalanche. It’s important not to let down your guard when wearing a transceiver. A false sense of safety lowers the level of situational awareness, causing many to ignore or misinterpret valuable information and signs.
Saturday, May 15th - Climber Scott Richards called Mount Rainier National Park on a cell phone requesting a rescue for his climbing partner Peter Cooley at 6:10 am, Saturday May 15th. The two-person team was ascending Liberty Ridge near 12,000 feet when Cooley’s crampon caught and he fell while leading. Richards was on the opposite side of the ridge crest when the accident occurred and was able to stop the fall using a hip belay. Cooley had fallen approximately 30 feet and hit his head, sustaining severe head trauma including a skull fracture as well as injuries to his left arm and leg. At roughly 6:30 am Ranger Mike Gauthier advised Richards via cell phone to chop out a platform, secure their tent, and stabilize and prepare Cooley for a lengthy evacuation. Scheduled cell phone calls were arranged to conserve the team’s cell phone batteries.
An Oregon Army National Guard Chinook and contract helicopter and climbing field teams were assembled for the rescue. At that time the weather was deteriorating rapidly, and forecasts predicted large amounts of precipitation. On its initial reconnaissance, the contract helicopter approached Liberty Ridge but due to whiteout conditions was forced to land on the Carbon Glacier at 8,000 feet and wait for a clearing. Because of the increasing clouds near the mountain, the Oregon National Guard Chinook helicopter was sent to Rimrock, WA instead of Kautz Helibase inside the park to connect with an aviation rescue team of NPS rangers and Rainier Mountaineering guides (RMI.)
An air-assisted rescue seemed uncertain because of weather conditions so a field team of two climbing rangers was hastily assembled and dispatched to make a quick ascent of Liberty Ridge. The advanced climbing rescue team of David Gottlieb and Chris Olson departed Ipsut Creek Campground Saturday at 4:00 pm. Heavy rain and snowfall slowed Gottlieb and Olson, forcing them to bivouac on lower Curtis Ridge that evening. A second team consisting of five climbing rangers also assembled at Ipsut Creek Campground. They carried extra supplies and prepared to support the advance team for a lengthy ground evacuation.
Late afternoon clearing around the mountain allowed the contract helicopter to depart the Carbon Glacier and return to Kautz Helibase. Richards was apprised of the rescue efforts and difficulties. He prepared for a night on the mountain at the accident site with Cooley.
Sunday, May 16th - Via cell phone, Richards reported that Cooley was in and out of consciousness all night and was unable to eat or drink. The weather remained inclement for much of the day.
A team of five climbers from Tacoma Mountain Rescue (TMR) departed Ipsut Creek Campground at 11:00 am after a briefing at Longmire. Another TMR team of two staffed the Camp Muir hut. The Chinook Helicopter with a NPS/RMI rescue team was held on standby in Yakima awaiting a break in the weather. The Chinook team prepared for a hoist insertion and evacuation of Cooley. The contract helicopter was also placed on standby at Kautz Helibase. Equipment and food caches to support field teams and rescue operations were prepared. Food, fuel, communication and rescue equipment were ferried via ground teams to lower Curtis Ridge (7,200 feet). Another cache for a yet-to-be-established field operations base camp was prepared at Kautz Helibase for a helicopter drop. A third sling load of supplies including a rescue litter was prepared for Richards at the accident site. In all, over 60 people joined in the rescue effort; the event generated international media attention.
At noon, the Chinook team attempted a flight with rescue personnel but heavy cloud cover and foul weather caused the mission to be aborted. Difficult climbing conditions and harsh weather made progress for the ground/climbing teams very arduous. Rangers Gottlieb and Olson worked through whiteout conditions and deep snow on the Carbon Glacier to prepare a field operations base camp at 8,800 feet in the Carbon Glacier basin below Willis Wall. A six-person climbing ranger team later joined them while the TMR team prepared a camp at 7,200 feet on lower Curtis Ridge. At 6:35 pm the weather briefly cleared above the Carbon Glacier, allowing the contract helicopter to conduct reconnaissance at the accident site and deliver a sling load of supplies, including a radio to replace Richard’s dead cell phone.
On the evening of May 16th, climbing rangers Gottlieb and Charlie Borgh prepared for an ascent of Liberty Ridge on the morning of the 17th. They planned to access the accident site, a 50-55 degree ice slope at roughly 12,000 feet, evaluate the scene and determine the feasibility for a helicopter evacuation or, if impossible, a technical rope rescue. Behind them climbing rangers Greg Johnson, Olson, Andy Anderson, Adrienne Sherred and Bree Loewen, laden with camping and rigging equipment, climbed to Thumb Rock and established an advanced camp. Ranger Glenn Kessler remained at base camp to manage field operations.
The Oregon Guard Chinook helicopter and crew remained on alert in Yakima and a contract helicopter remained on station at Kautz helibase. Richards, still at the accident site with Cooley was alerted of the plan.
Monday, May 17th - The contract helicopter attempted to sling load additional supplies to the climbing teams however the weather again thwarted the aviation operation. The Chinook insertion team also attempted a mountain flight but was unable due to weather and was forced to return to Yakima. Additional supplies and equipment were ferried via ground teams from Ipsut Creek campground to 7,200 feet on Lower Curtis Ridge.
Around noon, Gottlieb and Borgh arrived at the 11,800 foot accident site. Gottlieb attempted a medical assessment and relayed information to medical control via cell phone. Only limited care could be provided due to the conditions, patient and rescuer safety concerns. The team also prepared the area and set ice anchors preparing for a technical rescue. The weather improved throughout the afternoon and at 2:30 pm, the contract helicopter delivered a sling load to the 8,800 foot camp, while a supply cache was transported to Thumb Rock. The stabilizing weather also allowed the Chinook insertion team to head for the mountain at 4:30 pm.
As the Chinook lumbered over the mountain at 5:03 pm, Cooley was extracted via vertical litter hoist. He was immediately flown to Madigan Hospital and, very sadly, pronounced dead. Gottlieb and Borgh descended Liberty Ridge with Richards to spend the night at Thumb Rock.
Tuesday, May 18th - Gottlieb, Borgh and Richards descended the remainder of Liberty Ridge and were flown off the mountain from 8,800 feet along with the two other climbing rangers overseeing field aviation operations. All other field personnel descended to Ipsut Creek Campground, picking up the caches on their way.
Analysis:
Cooley and Richards were accomplished climbers, and this accident was not a result of any lapse in judgment or lack of skill. Cooley’s short, but ultimately fatal fall seems to be the result of an unfortunate misstep. Cooley was wearing a climbing helmet, but sometime during the fall he hit his head on a rock that contacted his temple just under the helmet brim. That impact eventually caused his death.
Any serious injury on a remote route at high elevation can be life-threatening due to the difficulty of access and evacuation. This accident highlights the difficulties of high altitude rescue on technical terrain, particularly when exacerbated by poor weather. Aviation is a key element of many successful upper-mountain rescues of climbers with serious injuries. When weather precludes flying, the survival of a critically injured climber is often compromised.
The fact that Richards was able to care for his climbing partner for almost 60 hours on a small exposed platform that he chopped in ice during poor weather speaks highly of him as an alpinist, rescuer and friend. The NPS strongly recommends choosing climbing partners carefully, considering not only the ability to reach the summit, but how a partner will perform in the event of an emergency or stressful situation.
While many were saddened by the outcome of this extended event after so much effort by so many people, it should be noted that the rescue was also a great success in that Richards returned safely and no rescuers were hurt. Without his climbing partner Richards would have been placed in the difficult position of soloing the route in order to reach safety.
Slip and Fall on Snow/Rock (Cahill)Washington, Mount Rainier, Liberty Ridge
On June 3rd at 7:15 am, Ranger Mike Gauthier was informed by dispatch of a climbing accident on Liberty Ridge below the Black Pyramid. Alan Hartman, the reporting party, stated that he witnessed two climbers fall several hundred feet, both sustaining serious injuries. He reported that a climber, later identified as John Cahill, possibly suffered a broken back and arm, and that his partner, later identified as Mark Anderson, had a hand injury and knee injuries as well as numerous contusions and abrasions.
The park requested assistance from both military and civilian helicopters. The Oregon National Guard offered a Blackhawk SAR helicopter with capability to perform the mission at 13,000 feet, however it was not immediately available. A civilian contractor, Whirlwind, had a bell-Jet Ranger in the area that was immediately available. At approximately 8:00 am, the helicopter began a reconnaissance flight with Ranger Gauthier. Shortly thereafter, the recon flight located an injured party at 11,800 feet on Liberty Ridge, near a “power-on” (hover) landing site. A plan was formulated to insert five climbing rangers close to the scene by “power-on” landings with another, more powerful A-Star helicopter. The Rangers were to access the scene, assess the patients, and prepare for an evacuation. The Blackhawk helicopter would later hoist the patients and transport them directly to a hospital.
At approximately 8:45 am, Hartman stated that a Danish climber was now on scene with Cahill, the most critically injured of the two patients. Hartman reported that Cahill was conscious but shocky and in extreme pain with breathing difficulties. During the fall, he had sustained serious injuries including head trauma, a broken leg, a broken arm, and broken ribs. Hartman also reported that Anderson was alert and straddled a rock 50 feet above Cahill with a severely injured hand and knee.
The park maintained scheduled contact with Hartman for the remainder of the incident. At 9:33 am, Hartman requested a bag-valve mask because Cahill needed rescue breathing. Soon thereafter, Hartman reported that Cahill no longer had a pulse and that CPR had been initiated. Hartman called back at 10:05 am to report that CPR had been stopped after approximately 30 minutes.
Hartman informed the NPS that there were five other climbers on scene who had postponed their summit climb to assist with the rescue. There was concern about the time needed to safely summit, as it was getting late and the climbers didn’t have enough equipment to safely down climb or assist with a technical lowering. Hartman was advised that climbing rangers would assist once on scene and that a sling load of equipment and supplies would be inserted at Thumb Rock. Moreover he was informed that the climbing rangers would probably conduct the rescue without further assistance.
The A-Star helicopter inserted rangers Gauthier, Gottlieb, Hendrickson and Olson over the course of two flights on a spiny rock outcropping near 11,000 feet on Liberty Ridge. The rangers ascended the ridge, reaching the accident site and Anderson at 1:27 pm. Once on scene, the NPS thanked the five independent climbers for their tremendous efforts and released them to finish their ascent of Liberty Ridge before nightfall.
The accident scene was steep, icy and exposed. Anderson was anchored to a rock outcropping directly below the Black Pyramid; Cahill was below him, tied off to a badly shredded climbing rope. Gauthier and Olson assessed Anderson and determined that it would be too hazardous to lower him off the route. It was evident that his leg and arm injuries would prevent him from assisting in the effort. Anderson was prepped for the helicopter hoist while rangers Gottlieb and Hendrickson rappelled a steeper pitch to assess Cahill. Once on scene, Cahill’s condition was confirmed and he was also prepared for hoist.
While the rangers prepared Anderson and investigated the site, the A-Star helicopter sling-loaded a supply cache at Thumb Rock. In doing so, they led the Oregon Guard Blackhawk helicopter to the accident scene. At 2:30 pm, Anderson was hoisted from the ridge and flown to Harborview Medical Center. Cahill’s body was retrieved on a subsequent flight at 3:39 pm. After which, the climbing rangers down climbed to Thumb Rock where they spent the night. The following day, the rangers descended the ridge to a landing zone on the Carbon Glacier and were shuttled off the mountain.
During this incident, a second climbing accident was reported on the Emmons Glacier at approximately 3:30 pm. The same incident management team handled both operations.
Loss of Control While Glissading (Thiel)Washington, Mount Rainier, Emmons/Winthrop Glacier Route
On June 3rd, Doug Thiel, 40, and his two climbing partners summited Mount Rainier via the Emmons Glacier Route. On their descent, Thiel started to experience a great deal of knee pain. The pain became so intense that he preferred to glissade instead of walking down. Thiel decided to glissade while roped and wearing crampons; it was the team’s intent to descend in this fashion back to Camp Schurman.
At 11,600 feet Thiel hit an icy section and was unable to stop his slide. He slid uncontrollably past his partners and pulled them off their feet, all three fell 75-100 feet before Thiel’s two partners arrested. Thiel sustained a lower left leg injury in the process and recalled the rope wrapping around his leg, which he feels contributed to the injury.
At 3:30 pm, the Park received a cell phone call from Thiel’s team detailing the accident and requesting assistance. With a large rescue and body recovery already in progress on Liberty Ridge, the I.C. dispatched a reserve climbing ranger team to the site of the new accident. Climbing rangers Stefan Lofgren and Stoney Richards were inserted on the Emmons Glacier via light helicopter near 11,300 feet. They ascended to the accident site, assessed Thiel and then carried him to a Landing Zone (LZ.) From that LZ Thiel was flown to the Kautz Helibase where he was transferred to an ambulance.
Analysis:
Thiel wanted to avoid requesting outside help while descending. Unfortunately, glissading, particularly on the upper mountain glaciers while wearing crampons, is dangerous. It would have been safer and more efficient for Thiel’s partners to have steadily lowered him in a sitting position, one rope-length at a time. On most sections they could have simply lowered him hand over hand. On steeper sections, they could have lowered him off set protection (pickets, ice axes, etc). In the end, it is always best to avoid glissading.
A reserve climbing rescue team established during the initial Liberty Ridge incident provided the opportunity to seamlessly complete this second mission. The mission difficulties were amplified, however, by a Park-wide power outage that cut base radio and phone line communications.
Avalanche (Casady/Vizcaya)Washington, Mount Rainier, Liberty Ridge
Luke Casady and Ansel Vizcaya departed White River Campground on Friday June 11th for a planned ascent of Liberty Ridge. The exact details of the subsequent 48 hours may never be known, but the facts uncovered during the subsequent search, body recoveries, and ensuing investigation suggest the following:
Casady and Vizcaya, experienced climbers, camped along Curtis Ridge on Friday and began the ascent up Liberty Ridge early Saturday morning. It is likely the pair climbed past Thumb Rock, around and continued up the ridge as the first signs of incoming weather appeared. With the winds building and the visibility decreasing the climbers continued pushing forward. By early evening, the reports at Camp Muir included significantly higher winds and heavy snowfall. Casady and Vizcaya were somewhere high on Liberty Ridge, and probably realized that they would have to hunker down and wait out the storm.
Through the night, winds hammered the mountain, blowing snow from some areas while building large slabs in others. This was an uncomfortable night for climbers everywhere on Mount Rainier; heavy snowfall and high winds destroyed several tents at Camp Muir.
By Sunday morning several inches of snow had fallen, but more importantly, the high winds had deposited large amounts of snow on leeward slopes. Casady and Vizcaya were probably camped between 12,900 feet and 13,500 feet above the Black Pyramid. Sometime during that night or the next day, Casady and Vizcaya were caught in a large avalanche. The avalanche probably released several hundred feet above them but below Liberty Cap. The avalanche most likely encompassed them and the entire upper route; everything was pushed down the 4,000 foot Liberty Wall to the Carbon Glacier. Neither climber could have survived the fall.
The storm turned back many teams back and significantly slowed the progress of others. Several teams were reported overdue, but this is expected following harsh weather. On June 16th at approximately 1:00 pm, rangers reported ten additional climbers descending the Emmons Glacier route (1); all were moving slowly. Progress for the climbers to the trailhead was so slow that rangers were unable to interview them until the morning of June 17th. All had climbed Liberty Ridge, some beginning their trips before, and some after, the Casady/Vizcaya team. None of the climbers reported seeing Luke and Ansel. A large-scale search was then initiated.
Rangers were dispatched to Camp Schurman to interview any remaining Liberty Ridge climbers descending the Emmons Glacier route, while aerial reconnaissance commenced near Liberty Ridge and the Carbon Glacier. Nearly an hour into the aerial search, a backpack and body were spotted on the Carbon Glacier below Liberty Wall at roughly 9,200 feet. Winds prevented the helicopter from landing near to the body, which rested near a large avalanche debris cone. The weather was very warm and many avalanches of significant size were noted from Liberty Wall. The location where the body was discovered is known particularly for its rock and ice fall hazards. For this reason ground recovery operations were planned at first light the next morning (during the coolest temperatures). Aerial search continued for the second climber that afternoon.
Further aerial reconnaissance on June 17th revealed a second backpack and climbing rope near the avalanche debris. An avalanche fracture line was also observed at approximately 13,600 feet on Liberty Ridge. After the recon flight, rangers Stoney Richards and Glenn Kessler were inserted on Curtis Ridge at 7,400 feet to continue observations with a telescope and support recovery operations the following day.
On the morning of June 18th a helicopter inserted rangers Chris Olson and Matt Hendrickson near the 9,000 feet on the Carbon Glacier. They quickly accessed the body and backpacks and had them flown out. After which, the rangers continued ground searching using avalanche transceivers. Their efforts were focused on the area near the recovered body and gear but no further clues were discovered. Due to further avalanche possibility and other safety issues, the ground team searched for one hour until the day got warmer.
A subsequent aerial search on June 18th revealed additional clues approximately 50 yards west of the recovered climber. Kessler and Richards were inserted on the glacier to investigate and dig through the snow debris. Nothing more was found and aerial searching resumed. The primary aerial search area consisted of Liberty Ridge, Liberty Wall, Willis Wall and the likely “fall lines” off of the Liberty Ridge. These were strongly considered to be the most likely areas in which to find clues.
On June 19th an Oregon Army National Guard Chinook helicopter with NPS Rangers conducted another aerial search while rescuing two other climbers at Thumb Rock. No new clues were detected.
On June 22nd a private contract ship provided additional aerial assistance. During that flight a climbing harness, carabiners, pulley and ice axe were spotted near 9,400 feet on the Carbon Glacier. Those clues were located near the avalanche debris cone below Liberty Wall; they were not retrieved.
On July 13th a climber reported seeing a large blue object on the Carbon Glacier near 9,300 feet while solo climbing Liberty Ridge. On July 14th and 15th climbing rangers Greg Johnson, Brent Rosato and Charlie Borgh climbed to the site and confirmed a body. Rangers Gauthier and Steve Klump were inserted via contract helicopter on July 15th to retrieve the remains. The body was successfully recovered via long line at 7:00 pm.
Analysis:
Casady and Vizcaya were found in their climbing harnesses but unroped (the rope found had no knots in it.) Their packs were largely packed, yet the pair had their parkas on. It appeared as though they were either still in camp, in the process of setting up or in the process of breaking camp when the avalanche occurred.
The fracture line noted on Liberty Wall was direct evidence of a large slab avalanche whose crown extended halfway to Ptarmigan Ridge, some 250 meters. The crown was only observed from the air, but appeared to vary in thickness from about 25-100cm. Whether or not this crown belonged to the avalanche that swept the climbers to their deaths is uncertain, as a smaller slide could have caught them. Large avalanches were occurring on the mountain following the Saturday night storm.
Other observations during the search indicated that large avalanches had run on other slopes in the general vicinity of Liberty and Ptarmigan Ridges. There had been no climbers on these slopes so it was concluded that most slides were naturally triggered events. It seems unlikely, that there were any climbers above Casady and Vizcaya, yet this remains unknown. The climbers had indicated when they registered that they had avalanche transceivers with them though neither was wearing one. A transceiver, however, would have provided no protection from such an avalanche.
It is important to note that snowstorms and avalanches do occur on Mount Rainier in the summer. Climbers during all seasons should be prepared to assess and mitigate avalanche issues.
(1) Additional climbers mean those in excess of the climbers that started out from Camp Schurman.
Stranded, Exceeding Abilities, Incompatible Partners, Poor Communication (Penn/Hancock)Washington, Mount Rainier, Liberty Ridge
Bruce Penn and Al Hancock departed White River to climb Liberty Ridge on June 13, 2004. It took them three days to reach the base of Liberty Ridge. On the third day, while looking at Liberty Ridge, Penn voiced concern to Hancock about the steepness of the route and his ability to climb it.
They spent the day talking about descent, but decided to re-evaluate their plan at the base of Liberty Ridge. On the fourth day, June 16th, an apprehensive Penn decided to start up the ridge with Hancock setting anchors and belaying every pitch. It took 14 hours for the pair to reach Thumb Rock; both individuals were exhausted and dehydrated when they finally arrived.
Penn knew that it should only take 4 to 6 hours to reach Thumb Rock from lower Curtis Ridge. He was surprised that other climbing parties were not placing protection and climbing the lower ridge without belay. He then realized that their climbing method was not practical for the route.
On the fifth morning, June 17th, Penn knew that he could not complete the climb and called 911 on his cell phone to ask for assistance. He did not discuss this with Hancock, and only informed him after the call had already occurred. That call reached Supervisory Climbing Ranger Mike Gauthier; during the conversation, Penn stated that his team could not go up or down but added that there were no injuries and they had enough food and fuel for a few days. Since there was no obvious urgency, and because an active SAR was already in progress on Liberty Ridge, Gauthier informed Penn that they would have to wait for a rescue or assistance.
At 12:44 pm, Penn called again stating that he “could not climb up or down from Thumb Rock.” Penn again acknowledged that he and his partner were okay, but that their arms were quite sore, they were dehydrated and that they had “bad vibes” about the route. Hancock felt that their best option was to continue the climb up and over, but refused to go back down. Penn was unwilling to continue up or down even with additional supplies and gear the NPS offered to drop at their location. It was explained to Penn that another more urgent SAR was in progress and that they would need to remain where they were until more personnel and resources were available.
At 7:30 Penn again called the Park requesting a helicopter rescue. When told that their rescue would still require a belayed down-climb, Penn seemed unwilling to cooperate. He said, “I just want to be off the mountain.”
On the sixth day, June 18th, arrangements were made with the Oregon National Guard for a helicopter hoist of the pair as rescue and recovery efforts remained ongoing for Casady and Vizcaya. Rangers made two airdrops for Penn and Hancock at Thumb Rock; those drops contained food, fuel and a cell phone.
On the seventh day, June 19th, an Oregon National Guard Chinook helicopter flew to the scene with three climbing rangers aboard. Ranger David Gottlieb was lowered to Thumb Rock via hoist and assisted both climbers back into the helicopter. The climbers were successfully removed from the mountain that day.
Analysis:
Penn and Hancock met on a guided climb of Mount McKinley the previous year. They had not climbed together before, but did discuss and research Mount Rainier and Liberty Ridge extensively. Some climbers often overlook the important aspect of climbing relationships and partner compatibility. The importance of a skills assessment, common goals and similar abilities are sometimes overshadowed by the excitement of summiting the mountain or “doing a route.”
A commendable aspect of this incident was that the team realized things were not going well and pulled back before getting injured. The NPS recognizes that people commit errors in judgment and make mistakes, but suggests that climbers not proceed when originally presented with questionable situations.
As a reminder, Liberty Ridge requires a substantial amount of physical strength, technical skill, effective communication and comfort with a heavy pack on steep ice for 6,000 feet of climbing.
Potential Fall on Ice (Baker)Washington, Mount Rainier, Kautz Glacier
On June 30th, Dallas Baker, 27, sustained a dislocated shoulder while descending the upper ice pitch of the Kautz Glacier near 11,800 feet. He was facing the glacier slope with his axes in the ice when his footing gave way. He was able to use his ax and catch the fall, but strained and dislocated his shoulder during the slip. Unable to reset the shoulder, his partner Alex Carroll called 911 seeking help from the NPS. The two slowly continued their descent to Camp Hazard.
A Hughes 500D helicopter was diverted from ongoing aviation operation to assist with the incident. Climbing ranger Stoney Richards was inserted at a small LZ on the cleaver separating the Turtle Snowfield from the Kautz Glacier around 11,000 feet. Richards climbed to the team and assessed Baker. By this time Baker’s shoulder had reduced on its own. Despite Baker’s improved condition, he was assisted back to the LZ and extracted with Richards to Kautz Helibase.
Analysis:
Baker was able to prevent a substantial fall by holding onto his planted ice tool. His dislocated shoulder seems to have been a much better option than falling down the 45 degree ice slope. The team was using a running belay as they downclimbed the route, so hopefully if he had fallen he would have been caught as soon as the rope between the climbers came under tension.
The result of a fall of this type, even if the running belay protection held, would probably have caused more serious injuries than a dislocated shoulder. A very similar accident at approximately the same location occurred six weeks later. In the second accident, however, a longer fall resulted and the running protection (two ice screws) ripped out.
Loss of Control While Glissading (Rettig)Washington, Mount Rainier, Unicorn Peak
On the morning of July 24th, a four-person team from the Mazamas Climbing Club set out to climb Unicorn Peak in the Tatoosh Range. On the descent from the summit at roughly 2:30 pm, Joska Rettig, 50, lost control while glissading a steep snowfield. She sustained a serious injury to her left knee and leg when she impacted the rocks at the base of the snowfield. One member of the team was sent to seek assistance from the NPS while climb leader Jae Ellers splinted Rettig’s leg with an ice axe and started her crawling back towards the road. Her progress was exceedingly slow, but very admirable.
Ellers was beginning a belay of Rettig down the steep loose rock gully feeding Snow Lake when climbing rangers Glenn Kessler and Thomas Payne arrived. The rangers assisted in Rettig’s descent until they met another NPS team of rescuers. That team placed Rettig on a backboard and then into a litter for what became a night carryout to the trailhead. Upon reaching the Snow Lake trailhead, Rettig was transferred to an awaiting ambulance.
Analysis:
Don’t glissade. It is safer to walk than to glissade; glissading is a tempting option that often results in lost equipment and injuries. The slope on which Rettig lost control was a combination of hard and soft snow. It is very likely that Rettig was able to control her speed on the upper sections of the slope where the sun had been shining for hours, but was unable to slow herself on the lower, mostly shaded section.
Fall on Glacier, Failure to Adequately Protect, Protection Pulled (Fry/Dufay)Washington, Mount Rainier, Kautz Glacier Route
On August 8th, at about 9:15 am while leading the second icy pitch of the Kautz Glacier Route, Bryan Fry, 28, fell on the 45-degree icy pitch. What protection had been placed between him and his partner, John Dufay, 25, pulled out as Fry fell. Fry’s fall jerked Dufay off the slope and the pair tumbled an estimated 400 to 600 feet before coming to a complete rest in a shallow crevasse.
Dufay suffered multiple lacerations and contusions during the fall; Fry sustained several minor injuries and a badly broken ankle. Dufay assisted Fry onto a narrow shelf in the crevasse and made him as comfortable as possible before seeking help. Dufay unroped and descended the route and through the ice chute back towards Camp Hazard. In the ice chute above Camp Hazard, Dufay met an RMI guide, Lyndon Mallory, who radioed the NPS for help.
Due to the terrain at the accident site, and the anticipated hazards involved in a carryout, an air evacuation was the fastest and safest option available. At 11:20 am, ranger Glenn Kessler spoke directly with Dufay via radio and received a first-hand account of the situation. Mallory then ascend with Dufay back to the accident site and helped care for Fry. A helicopter hoist operation was arranged to evacuate Fry from the location.
At 4:52 pm, an Oregon Army National Guard Blackhawk lifted off from Kautz Helibase and flew to the accident site with ranger Kessler. Kessler was hoisted onto the glacier where Fry and Mallory were waiting. Fry was assessed, prepared for evacuation and hoisted back into the Blackhawk with Kessler. Mallory and Dufay descended on foot but were slowed by Dufay’s injuries and exhaustion. The two bivied around 9,000 ft. and arrived at the Comet Falls Trailhead at noon the next day.
Analysis:
Fry and Dufay were lucky not of have fallen farther; the Kautz Glacier becomes an icecliff only a few hundred feet below where they came to rest. Fry reported that he had only one or two 9cm ice screws placed when he fell.
Dufay recalls getting in position to arrest Fry’s fall, but was unsuccessful stopping the fall due to the steep angle and icy conditions. He recalls slowing several times thinking the fall was over, only to be yanked downhill again. When he came to rest, he was “balled up” in the rope. Given the distance of their fall, it is impressive that both did not suffer more severe injuries.
While the Kautz Glacier route can be an ice-free snow climb until midseason, several parties have underestimated the difficulty of late season conditions. As the winter snow cover disappears and more ice presents itself, there is a need for more ice climbing equipment. It is difficult to predict how much ice climbing gear may be needed given variety of conditions possible. It is best to prepare for the worst and bring a few extra screws.
Fall on Rock, Climbing Unroped, Uprepared for Conditions, Lack of Experience, Stranded on Route (Duncan)Washington, Mount Rainier, Knapsack Pass
On October 2nd at 6:00 pm, a group of seven service members on leave from Fort Lewis Army Base began a hike to Knapsack Pass in the Mowich Lake area. Forty-five minutes into the hike, two members of the party observed a rock face south of Knapsack Pass and decided to try and climb it to summit the ridge.
As the two started up the face, one fell about 60 vertical feet onto a talus slope and rolled another 100 feet before stopping. Michael Duncan, 19, sustained serious head, neck and back injuries including 4 broken vertebrae and numerous lacerations, contusions and abrasions. His party members rushed to his aid and provided basic care. Meanwhile, the second climber became stranded on the face and needed help to descending. With sunset approaching, one of the party members hiked back to Mowich Lake to summon help.
Upon receiving a 911 call at about 10:00 pm, NPS rangers responded to the scene while a military helicopter was launched from Fort Lewis. Rangers stabilized Duncan until the military medic was inserted via hoist to the accident site. Duncan was then placed in a litter and hoisted into the hovering helicopter and taken to a hospital.
Rangers Uwe Nehring, Ritterbusch, Walker, Hull, Burns and Bagocius then turned their attention to the cold, stranded climber who was perched on a small overhanging ledge, wearing only a t-shirt, shorts and sneakers. The temperature, now in the lower 40’s, was dropping as ranger Nehring climbed to the ledge and set up an anchor station that allowed the other rangers to lower the stranded man to safety.
Analysis:
Climbing without experience or protection could have cost both young men their lives. The fifth class face they chose to climb warranted a rope, rock protection, harnesses and some climbing skill and experience. The pair admitted that they had none of these.
Poor planning and decision-making led to additional suffering on the part of all the men. None were prepared for unexpected delays and nighttime operations. Wearing only shorts, t-shirts and sneakers, the team had left the trailhead near dusk on an autumn day enroute to an elevation of 6,300 ft without warm clothing, lights or any kind of emergency overnight gear. Every member of the party was an EMT, which significantly contributed to saving Duncan’s life.
Glissading With Crampons (Beoffoli)Washington, Mount Rainier, Muir Snowfield
On October 3rd shortly after 4:30 pm, Chris Beoffoli, 34, began his descent from Camp Muir. While glissading near 7,800 feet on the Muir Snowfield, Beoffoli caught his left crampon on the snow and fractured his ankle.
At 5:15 pm Mt. Rainier National Park received the 911 cell phone call requesting a rescue. Shortly after sunset, an eight person NPS ground evacuation team began their ascent to the accident site. They arrived on scene two hours later and assessed Beoffoli’s condition, packaged and lowered him back to Paradise in a litter. They arrived at the trailhead at 1:00 am. Beoffoli was released into the care of his partner who drove him a hospital for treatment.
Analysis:
If you must glissade, remove your crampons, know your descent line and watch for changing snow/ice conditions. Every year numerous climbers and hikers must be rescued because they choose to glissade.
Avalanche (Koester/Little)Washington, Mount Rainier, Ingraham Glacier
On Sunday October 24th, climbers Aaron Koester and Matt Little contemplated a summit ascent from their high camp at Cadaver Gap, but due to a late start the pair instead decided to train and explore and the crevasses on the Ingraham Glacier. Near 11,700 feet, the team entered a large cavernous crevasse close to the Disappointment Cleaver. They traversed some 75 yards into the crevasse and found an exit ramp out the other side. While ascending the 35-40 degree exit ramp, the snow slope fractured and slid.
The slab was estimated to be about 8-14” thick and ran roughly 150 feet. The avalanche swept both climbers back into the crevasse. Koester was pinned against the ice wall of the crevasse and was completely buried by the debris. Little was partially buried; only his arm and head were exposed. Little spent about 30 minutes extricating himself from the entrapment before beginning the search for his partner. By the time he located and freed Koester’s head, Koester had no pulse and was “very blue.”
Little left the accident site and descended the Ingraham Glacier back to high camp, packed up the team’s equipment and continued down to Camp Muir. Along the descent, Little attempted to contact the authorities using a family service radio. A hunter picked up the transmission and notified the NPS of the accident at 4:58 pm. Twenty minutes later, Little arrived at Camp Muir and called the Park on the Camp Muir emergency radio. After providing more specific information about the accident, Little descended to Paradise and met with park rangers.
The following day, climbing rangers Mike Gauthier, Bree Loewen, and Adrienne Sherred with the assistance of an MD 500 contract helicopter were inserted at Ingraham Flats, 11,000 feet. They climbed to the cavernous crevasse and performed the body recovery. An analysis of the fracture, slide, and ramp area was not possible however, due to lingering instability in the snowpack, time limitations and deteriorating weather. Koester’s body was successfully recovered that day.
Analysis:
A recent storm had deposited only a few inches of snow, but high winds preceding the climb had transported this snow significantly. Many areas were scoured; others had deep pockets of snow. Autumn is an atypical time for avalanche accidents, at that time of year the dangers of falling on hard ice, snow bridges collapsing, rockfall and icefall are generally more pressing. As this accident illustrates, climbers must evaluate the avalanche risks at any time of year.
The fact that these climbers chose to wear avalanche beacons on the day of the incident indicates and increased level avalanche awareness. They knew that they were in avalanche terrain and that there was a possibility of a slide occurring. However, no assessments of the snow stability took place. It is possible that if the climbers had done an assessment, they may have recognized the snow instability and avoided the terrain trap.
As the use of avalanche transceivers has become more standard in alpine climbing, it’s important for climbers to connect the reasoning of wearing such a device with the conditions. Donning a transceiver does not prevent the consequences of an avalanche. It’s important not to let down your guard when wearing a transceiver. A false sense of safety lowers the level of situational awareness, causing many to ignore or misinterpret valuable information and signs.
posted by Mike Gauthier at 11:16 AM
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